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I. INTRODUCTION
It is not uncommon for students of international trade to run
into the phenomenon of smugglingparticularly when their task in-
volvestranslatingthe resultsof theoretical analysisinto policy .advice.
Smuggling, being the practice of usingillegal trade channelsor fake
foreign trade declarationsfor the purposeof evading the payment of
duties and taxes, inevitably causesdistortions in international trade
data and in policies subsequentlyformulated from it. These distor-
tions usually arise as a consequence of the fact that smuggling,if
successfullycarried out, resultsin the omissionof some import and
export shipments from the data on foreign trade whichare normally
collectedat the customsfrontier.
There is reason to believe that such omisSions.may .be quite
substantial, with the level depending on the restrictivenessof the
trade control regime. For instance_in the Philippines,the Bureauof
Customs reported a total of P320 million worth of shipments seized
in 1981 for various violations of Customs and Tariff Laws, This
.amount is 2.8 percent of the Customs revenue collected for that
year and is0.6 percent of the total valueof import shipmentsfor the
same year. Consideringthe existence of numerous ports of entry in
the Philippines and consideringthat relatively, high rates of duty are
charged on shipmentsimported into the country, it is believed that
the amount that wassuccessfullysmuggledin waslargerstill and that
the amount apprehendedwasjust the tip of the iceberg.
However, researchin this area has beenhard to come by despite
its obvious importance, particularly to developing countries whose
economies are normally characterized by restrictive trade policies.
Collector, Port of Manila, Bureau of Customs.
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One possible reasonfor this dearth of researchisthe sensitivity of
the issue involved. For most developing countries, customs duties
are a major source of government revenue,and therefore, any hint
of mismanagement in this area could easily become a controversial
topic. Since one can hardly go into an analysisof smugglingwithout
begging the question of where the fault lies,it may bethat research-
ers tend to avoid the topic becauseof its potential asan explosive
issue.
Another possible reason is the statisticalelusiveness of the con-
cept. If the estimation of magnitudes relating to an economic or
social phenomenon for which data are openly published sometimes
proves difficult, what more for thoserelating to an illicit activity, the
successfulaccomplishment of which heavily depends on secrecy?
As several authors have shown, attempts at quantitative estimation
in this areaarenot only difficult but hazardousaswell.
These difficulties, however, do not justify the lack of serious
attempts at suchan estimation. A review of the literature in this area
reveals that empirical studies have mainly been preoccupied with
establishing indicators of the presence of illegal trade. Only in
Simkin's 1974 article was there an attempt at estimating the levelof
smuggling. He was able to generate an estimate of unrecorded
exports from Indonesia by first postulating a normal price and a
normal quantity for some of the country's main export products.A
comparison of actual trade figures with theseestablishedprice and
quantity levelshastherefore led to conclusionsconcerning the level
of unrecorded exports from Indonesia.
This study isanother attempt at generating suchan estimate, this
time from data on Philippine import trade. However, a more formal
approach shall be used which involves,first of all, the development
of a microeconomic model which tries to explain the level of smug-
gling activity in terms of factors which impinge on the trader's
decisionto engagein smuggling.
A regression estimateof the model shallthen becarried out using
a comprehensivesetof data on Philippine imports which wascollated
from unpublished records of the GATT Secretariat in Geneva, the
Philippines' National Census and Statistics Office, the Bureau of
Customs, and from publications of the Central Bank. From the re-
sults,conclusionson the natureand on the level of smugglingactivity
in the Philippines may be drawn. It ishopedthat somepolicy impli-
cations could alsobederived from them.ALANO: IMPORT SMUGGLING 159
II. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
A. The Nature of the Problem
Smuggling is defined in the dictionary as "the act of importing or
exporting goods secretly without payment of legal duty or in viola-
tion of law." It is an ancient phenomenon, and today it usually
comes about when the government, with an artificial trade barrier,
manages to establish a set of prices which make certain transactions
profitable and then tries to controvert the incentives to enter into
these transactions by making them illegal. Smuggling occurs in both
import and export trade. This study isconcerned only with the more
interesting problem of import smuggling.
A popular notion of smuggling is usually that of some contra-
band or highly dutiable cargo being carried in a boat which quietly
sails into the night and stealthily lands its load in a dark, isolated
spot beyond the reach of customs authorities. However, this is not
the only way by which smuggling can be carried out. More con-
venient and possibly less costly methods of evading import duties
usually involve the useof legal trade channels in bringing the goods in.
The customs processing of these goods is then either short-circuited
or manipulated to enable the importer to avoid payment of the
correct duties. One such method involves the misdeclaration of the
imported items. This is carried out by submitting a fraudulent cus-
toms declaration in order to pass the imported goods off assomething
else. This practice is usually resorted to if the actual importation
carries a high rate of duty. The shipment is declared to contain items
which carry a lower rate, and although the smuggler would have to
pay some duty, he still gains by the amount of duty evaded.
Another way by which the tariff barrier could be contravened is
by undervaluing the shipment. This time the shipment is described
correctly but the value declared is lower than the actual value of the
importation. Although the correct tariff rate is applied, the trader
manages to pay a lower duties. This practice is usually prevalent
among importers of items which are not often imported, as well as
among those who have sole distributorship of certain items, since in
these situations, there are usually no other importations of a similar
nature against which the customs authorities can cross-check the
declaration on the undervalued shipment.
Misclassification is another form of evasion used. This is carried
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heading which carries a lower rate than the correct tariff heading.
Duties are therefore evadedthrough the application of the lowerad
valorem rate. The chances of success-in evading duties through
misclassification usually depends on the technical complexity of
the imported good. For instance,chemical compounds which need
to be analyzedin a laboratory to be identified would more often
be the subject of misclassificationthan, say, a hand tool which the
customsexaminer may easily identify throughacursoryexamination.
The method •which bringsthe highest return, however, is that
which involvesthe use of fake•delivery documentation in spiriting
the imported goodsout of the customszone. No payment of duties
is generally •madeas the Signaturesof the collecting Officers are
usually forged. However, the risk involved in this type of operation
isnormally high.
The schemesemployed for the evasionof duties describedabove
will be referred to as "technical smuggling"sincethe evasionis car-
ried out by fraudulently manipulatingthe technical processby which
dutieson the imported goodsare assessed. This isto be differentiated
from "pure smuggling"wherein the legalchannelsof importation are
by-passedcompletely, as in the boat-in-the-night type of operation.
The many facets•of•the smugglingproblem discussedabove reveal
that •modelswhich are gearedtowards the analysisof the pure type
of smuggling alone may not totally conform with practical ex-
perience, for the variousmethods of technical smugglingapparently
provide more convenient and even possibly more efficient meansof
evadingimport duties.
For one, the technological advancesin the •shippingindustry,1
Coupled with the increasingimportance of transport and handling
costsin coastwisetrade, havemade technicalsmugglingan increasing-
ly attractive alternative especially for large-scaleoperators, as it
enablesthem to take•advantagenot-only of the relatively lower trans-
1, One factor w.hich is believed to have contributed greatly to the peesentstate of af-
fairs in the smuggling field is the lnci-easinguse of container vans for seaborne cargo. Con=
tainer vansare huge steel boxes ranging from 20 to 40.feet in length which are used tOhold
cargo while in transit, Although they were designed primarily to provide for more ease
and efficiency in cargo handling, they have also proven to be convenient vehiclesfor smug-
gttng cargo, This is because containerized cargo are more difficult to lnspect than those
-which are contained in crates or boxes since-containers open only at orm end and the only
way a customs examiner could verify those items which are packed deep into the container
is for him to unload first those that a_replaced at the outer end. A thorough examination
could therefore be time_consuming and costly considering the size of a -container and the
amount of cargo that could, be packed in•toone. This technological improvement has there-
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port costs but also of the cargofacilities whichcome with importing
through legalchannels.
However, the occurrenceof the pure type of smuggling cannot be
discounted,asthere are doubtlessa number of traderswho may find
this type of an operation profitable. If one is to assumethat the
smuggler acts rationally, then his choice of smuggling technique
should be the result of his evaluation of the respectivecosts and
benefits of his options. Therefore, a-realistic a priori judgment
regarding the type of smugglingactivity that is predominant in a
particular country cannot be made without first considering the
various factors which affect the returnsfrom illegal,trade into that
country.
Such an analysis, when applied to the Philippine case, tends
toward the conclusion that technical smugglingisthe likely predo-
minant smuggling activity despite the presence of numerous lairs
within the archipelago'sseven thousand islandsservingasidealdrop-
off points for the trader who engagesin pure smuggling.This is
becauseone has to consider that HongKong and Singapore,the two
free trade areasin.the region, are 633 nautical miles and 1,342 nau-
tical milesfrom the Philippines,respectively.Sucha situation, there-
fore, makes these entrepot centers near enough to be convenient
sourcesof items for smugglingand yet far enoughasto render the
boat-in-the-night type of variety uneconomical..This, coupled with
the increasingadvantagesof shipping through legal channels,makes
technical smuggling a relatively more attractive option. The theo-
retical model to be developed in the following section will therefore
be formulated under the assumption that technical smuggling is the
predominant illegal trade activity.
B. The Model
in this section., an attempt will be made to develop a hypothesis.
of the smuggler's calculus within the framework of the .standard
economic theory of choice under uncertainty following the works
of Becker (1974) and Ehrlich (1974). It shall be assumed that, at the
beginning of each period, the trader makes a choice as to whether
he Should smuggle or engage in legal.trade. If he chooses the latter,
he adds to hisinitial stock of wealth, W, a sum S representing returns
to legal trading which we will assume to be riskless, This would
enable him to reach a new wea|th level Y (= W + S) where Y is
assumed to be known with certainty given the state of the world
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If, however, he chooses to engagein smuggling, he will realize
additional returns, aPfXR, representingthe proportion, a, of the
total duties, PfXR (where Pf is the foreign price of the import ship-
ment X which is being levied a duty at rate R). The proportion a is
defined to be 0 _; a _; 1 where a = 0 means that no duties are evaded
and that the trader has made a truthful declar._tion while a = 1
connotes pure smuggling.
If the existence of an exchange control regime is assumed, the
smuggler will then have to procure foreign exchange from unofficial
sources to cover the undeclared portion of the importation, aPfX.
This will in turn entail an additional cost involving the blackmarket
premium, E = Eb -- Eo, on the additional foreign exchange required
to carry out the smuggling activity, where Eb is the official rate. This
additional cost factor can be expressed as EaPfX. Smuggling, if suc-
cessful, may therefore increase the wealth level of the smuggler to:
(1) A = Y + aPfXR - EaPfX
It is, however, an unlawful activity and any trader who decides to
engagein it must assumethe risk o_getting caught and being impos-
ed the corresponding penalty. If a penalty function G = FaPfX is
defined, where the penalty rate is F > R, a failure in the smuggling
attempt will bring about a wealth level
(2) B = Y- EaPtX- FaPfX
If the possibility of being caught is p, then there exists two states of
the world for the smuggler: state of the world A, with probability
of occurrence (l-p) and state of the world B with probability of
occurrence p.
The smuggler will therefore now choose A so asto maximize his
expected utility for a one-period consumption prospect:
(3) max E(U)=(1 -- p)U(Y+aPtX - EaPtX)+ pU(Y- EaPfX-
FoPfX) or by using equations (1) and (2) above
(4) max E(U) = (1-p)U(A) + U(B)
where U is an indirect utility function that converts income flows in
A and B into consumption flows. In this analysis, it shall be assumed
that marginal utility ispositive everywhere.
Following Ehrlich's (1974) analysis, it can be established that the
first-order condition yields (primes and double primes represent first
and second derivatives respectively):ALANO: IMPORT SMUGGLING 163
(5) R- E pUJ(B) m
E- F (1-p)U'(A)
The left-hand side of the expression is the slope of the transforma-
tion curve between the two states of the world confronting the smug-
gler, while the right-hand side is the slope of an indifference curve
defined along dE(U) = 0. This is shown in Figure 1 with the axes
representing the two states of the world A and B. Q V is the trans-
formation curve which extends from point V on the 45-degree cer-
tainty line where a = 0 (no smuggling) and where A = B = V (legal
trade is the only source of income), to point Q where a = 1 (the
trader engagesin pure smuggling) and where
A = Y+PfXR - EPfX
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U isthe utility curve which istangentto the transformation.curve at
point R.
The second-ordercondition is:
(6) E'_U)=(1-p)U'_A) (PfXR-EPfX)2+pU'_(B)(EPpX+FPfX)2< O.
It will besatisfied if Un(A) < 0 and UI_B)< 0.,implying risk aversion
on.the part of the.smuggler. 2 •
In this analysis, an interior, solution is.of interest particularly.
since an a priori assumptionthat .0< a < 1 cannot be made;assuch,
an occurrencewould dependonthe parametervalues.It would there-
fore be usefulto find out the rangeof parametervalueswithin which
an interior solution may occur. Since expected marginal utility is
decreasingwith a, it must therefore follow that




(8) EXU) I =(llR)U_( Y+PfXR-EPfX) (PfXR-EPfX) -
I
Ia=l ..
pU' (Y--EPFX-- FPfX) (EPfX + FPfX) < 0
which canbe rewritten as
(9) (1--p)R > E + pF
and "
(l-p) U' (Y+PfXR-EP, X) (E) + pU'( Y -EPfX-FPfX) (E+F)
(10) (1--p)R <
U'(Y + PrXR - EPtX) •
By arrangingthe terms of the first expressionto
(11) (l-p) R - E>pF,
its implication becomes clear: the expected rate of return should be
2. The proofof thisconditionfor riskaversionisfoundin Arrow(1965, pp.28-44).ALANO: IMPORT SMUGGLING i65
greater than the expected penalty rate. The two expressionsthere-
fore yield a set of positive-valuedlimits for the parameters •asa con-
dition for the occurrence of an interior solution.
III. EMPIRICAL•ANALYSIS
A. The Empirical Model
The main objective of this exerciseis to carry out an empirical
test of the theoretical model developed earlier. Since most of the
empirical works in this field of study have mainly been directed
towards the task of isolating the smuggling•component of the ob-
served discrepancies in partner-country data, it would therefore
be interesting to try to find out how well the model would fare in
explaining thesediscrepancies.
Given, therefore, the validity of the theoretical model and the
behavioral implications derived from it, a stochasticfunction defin-
ing the amount smuggledin a given period, aPfX, asa function of
its basicdeterminantsmay be specifiedasfollows:
(aP_X)I = F( Yi,Pi,Et,Fi,Ri,Ui )
where
Yi = the incomelevelin period i
Pi = the probability of gettingcaughtin period /
Ei = the blackmarket premium in period/. This was repre-
sented in the theoretical discussion by the variable
(Eb -- Eo) where E b was the blackmarket exchange
rate and Eo wasthe official rate
Fi = the penalty rate in periodi
Ri = the nominal rate of duty in periodi
U/ = represents random errors and stochastic effects and is
assumedto havea normal distribution.
Since time series data will be used to estimate the above_Fi and
Ri will be dropped from the list of specified variables since these
variables are fixed by legislation and therefore hardly Changefrom
year to year. However, the dummy variablesdl and d2 will .beadded
to account for possible shifts in the regression plane resulting from
the effects of containerization in 1970 and the advent of martial law
in 1972, respectively.
The specifiedequation therefore takesthe form:166 JOURNAL OF PHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
(aPX) = r(v,., pi,Ej,all,d2, )
The matter of estimating each variable in the above specification
will now be discussedin turn:
1. The Amount Smuggled (aPeX):
Since the amount smuggled is not observable, it shall beapproxi.
mated by the discrepancy in partner country data, Di = Xi--lh where
Xi refers to the export value reported by the exporting country and
/_ refers to the corresponding import value reported by the importing
country, both in period i. The analysiscovers data relating to Philip-
pine [mport trade from the country's three major trading partners,
namely: Japan, the United States, and the European Economic
Community.
However, earlier studies analyzing discrepancies in partner-
country trade data have pointed out that smuggling is not the only
source of these discrepancies. In fact, for the Philippine case, the
1976 article by Bautista and Tecson mentions a fairly comprehen-
sive list of other possible sources, to wit:
a. transport cost and other charges (whenever export data
are expressed in f.o.b, while corresponding import data are
expressedin c.i.f.)
b. exchange rate overvaluation
c. time lagsin recording
d. faking of export declaration and inaccuracies in export
recording
e. difference in commodity coverageand classification
f. difference in the method of designating partner countries as
to provenance and destination.
Transport costs and other charges will not be a source of dis-
crepancy in this study since both export and import values are ex-
pressedin f.o.b, terms.
As Bautista and Tecson (1976) observed,_exchange rate over-
valuation may cause a disparity in partner country trade data if the
data-collecting institution (the GA-I-I- Secretariat in this case), in
converting data in domestic currency into dollar equivalents for
international comparability, uses an exchange rate which may be
different from the free market rate used by developed partner
countries. This is normally the case for countries under exchange
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gence between official and free market rates, However, they also
correctly point out that this factor is not likely to.be a major source
of discrepancy in the Philippine case becausethe National Census
and Statistics Office (NCSO) collects trade data in dollar terms.
In fact, the source document for import data is actually a copy of
the importer's declaration in dollars, which in turn is based on the
commercial invoice issued by the exporter at the other end.
Time lags in recording may result in discrepancies in partner
country data because some goods are reported as having been ex-
ported by the source country and not ashaving been received by the
importing country. However, as Bhagwati (1974) points out, the
effect of this factor shows up in annual import data only if the
import level changes over time. For if the import level shows a con-
stant trend, then the discrepancies due to lags in recording would
be offsetting from year to year. This is because "the imports of this
year which are not recorded due to the lag but which carry over into
next year's import statistics will be offset by the imports of last
year carried over into this year's statistics" (Bhagwati 1974, p. 140).
On the other hand, if the import level is rising, some understatement
will occur, while a declining import level will result in some over-
statement. However, this factor is statistically estimable and an
attempt ismade in this study to correct for its effect by adjusting the
import values accordingly.
The lag can actually be broken down into two components: the
lag due to the transit time between the exporting and importing
country and the lag due to the delay in recording at the importing
end. If one assumes instantaneous recording at the country of
export, then the total lag will consist of the sum of these two com-
ponents. However, if some delay in the recording of exports is
assumed, then the lag from the above-named components will be
partially offset by this delay. Table I shows approximate travel times
to the Philippines from the countries under consideration. NCSO
officials engaged in the collection of import statistics have approxi-
mated the lag in recording to be one month on the average.
Assuming a minimal lag in export recording for developed coun-
tries, the adjustment in import data that would account for the lag in
recording could therefore be formulated asfollows:168 JOURNAL OFPHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
where
a = the degree of understatementof the import value due
to the time lag in recording
It = the unadjusted import value
t = the time period in years
L = the lag due to transit time from the exporting coun-
try to the importing country in months
R = the net lag in recording time in months which is equal
to 1 for trade with the countries considered..
Table1






a. Averagedover the shipping-schedules of the membersof the Association of Inter-
nationalShippingLinesin Manila,Philippines.
The degree of understatement, a, could then .beapplied to the





/_ will therefore be usedin generatingthe •discrepancies Di, defined
above.
Discrepanciesmay alsobe causedby inaccuraciesin recordingat
the exporting end. Some trading partners,may even have existing
trade policies which provide incentives for the faking of export
invoices.As earlierstudieshavepointedout, an export duty may give
rise to underinvoicing of exports while controls on the acquisition
and use of foreign exchange may encourage its illegal outflow
through export overinvoicing. By virtue of the earlier definition of
the discrepancy,Di, the former situation could be expected to con-ALANO: IMPORT SMUGGLING 169
tribute towards a negativeDi while the latter would tend to strength-
en the occurrence of a positive Dj. However, these factors are ex-
pected to have only a minimal influence on Di sincethe trade poli-
cies of the countries under Study are seento offer very little incen-
tive for their occurrence,
As mentioned earlier, misclassification is one of the techniques
used in technical smuggling.Therefore, the discrepanciesin partner
country data causedby its occurrence may either be the resultof
attempts to evadeimport taxesor due to just plaininadvertence on
the part of thc_e tasked with maintaining the statistics on trade
transactionson either side;The effect of the former factor is part
of what the model is intended to explain. The latter factor, on the
other hand, isviewed asa random eventand would therefore not be
expected tohave any systematicinfluence onthe discrepancy,Di.
The samething istrue for discrepanciesin partner-country data
arising out of wrongly designated partner countries. An incentive
for doing this on purpose usually arisesas a result of a common
practice by customs authorities to blacklist countries which are
usual sourcesof contraband or smuggled items and to require a
rigid check on imports from thesecountries.As Bautistaand Tecson
(1976) have pointed out, the influence of inadvertent errors in
designatingpartner-countrieson the discrepancy,Di, canbe expected
to be minimal for countries which have very little entrepSt trade.
However, the effects of intentional misdeclaration of the source
country is an entirely different matter and should be given serious
consideration particularly since some products from the U.S. and
EEC may passthrough either Hong Kong or Singaporefirst in entre-
pSt trade before they areimported into the Philippines.
It may be useful to first determine in what direction this factor
may affect the discrepanciesin partner-country data. As mentioned
earlier, the blacklisting by customsof countrieswhich are frequent
sourcesof smuggledgoodscan giverise to attempts at declaringthe
wrong source country for imports. This is particularly true in cases
where the goods have to pass through some entrepSt countries
before reaching their final destination. The imported goods would
thus be declared as coming from the entrepSt country instead of
from the actual sourcecountry. To make the situation appear more
convincingto the customsauthoritiesof the country of final destina-
tion, the goodsmay even be warehousedfor a few days at the entre-
pot country with a new invoice possibly being issued by a subsi-
diary of the originalexporter.170 JOURNAL OF PHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
In this case, the transaction would be carried in the trade statis-
tics of the original source,, country as an export to the country of
final destination while the latter would carry it as an import from the
entrepat country. The entrep6t country, on the other hand, may or
may not reflect the transaction as an export, depending on the
representations made by the parties involved. The resulting discre-
pancy, Oi, would therefore be positive if the statistics of the source
country and the country of final destination were to be compared,
while a comparison of the corresponding trade figures of the entre-
p_)t country and the destination country would reveal either
a zero or a negative Di depending on whether or not the tran-
saction is reflected by the entrep6t country as an export. But the
absence of any institutionalized scheme for comparing the export
and import data covering a particular transaction would make it
virtually unnecessary to falsify export declarations at either the
source country or the transit country, thereby making the latter case
involving a negative O i for data comparisons with the entrep£)t
country the more probable occurrence.
However, the blacklisting by customs of some source countries
would not serve as a strong incentive for Philippine importers to
wrongly declare their imports as originating from the two entrepbt
centers for Philippine trade, namely, Hong Kong and Singapore,
since these two countries themselves have perennially been in that
list, having been frequent sources of apprehended smuggled goods.
But this is not the only reason for importers to engagein such a prac-
tice; a much more compelling reason is that of undervaluation.
Traders in Hong Kong and Singapore have a reputation for not
being too particular about whatever values are reflected in the in-
voices that they issue. In fact, some have been known to issuetwo
invoices for a single transaction, one being meant for the purpose
of making a customs declaration at the importing end. This there-
fore serves as a strong incentive for traders wanting to undervalue
and whose goods transit through theseentrep6t centers to misdeclare
their imports as having been exported from these transit points
rather than from the actual source country, since this would enable
them to usean invoice issued in the entrep6t country.
As mentioned earlier, this would result in a positive Di if the sta-
tistics of the source country and the country of final destination
are compared. However, this discrepancy is part of what the model
seeksto explain since it is due to yet another form of technical smug-
gling.ALANO: IMPORT SMUGGLING 171
It has been argued in this section that of the five factors Which
have been identified to cause partner-country data discrepancies
besides smuggling, one (transport cost) has been made irrelevant
by virtue of the choice of data to be used, a second factor (exchange
rate overvaluation) has been explained to be inoperable by virtue of
the fact that NCSO data are collected in dollar terms fromthe in-
voices presented by importers, while a third (time lag in recording)
has been taken account of through the application of the appropriate
correction factor, two factors (intentional misclassification and mis-
declaration of source country) have been identified to be part of
what the model seeks to explain, while the rest have been shown to
have no systematic effect on the behavior of Di. Thus the use -
for estimation purposes - of Di as a proxy variable for the amount
smuggled seems to be justified since the least squares assumption that
the error term U i of the empirical model reflects only stochastic
effects of random events appears to be satisfied.
The data on partner-country discrepancies is generated from
annual partner-country export values provided by the GATT Secre-
tariat in Geneva while corresponding import values are from the
Philippine National Census and Statistics Office (NSCO). The data
runs from 1965 to 1978 and are disaggregated down to the one-digit
SITC (section) level. To give an idea of the data structure, the totals
per SITC section (aggregated over the period under study) for each
of the countries considered are presented in Table 2. The rank
alongside each value is the result of ranking them from the highest
positive down to the highest negative total.
It should be noted that some totals turned out to be negative.
This may be due to several reasons:
a. Undervaluation of exports to evade export taxes in the coun-
try of exportation.
b. Import overvaluation for the purpose of salting foreign
exchange from the importing country.
c. Export and import misclassification (whether inadvertent or
not).
d. Recording errors.
Of the four reasons enumerated, only one - import misclassifica-
tion - relates to the problem of smuggling. It should, however, be
noted that recorded negative discrepancies due to misclassification in
one SITC section should turn up aspositive discrepancies in some other
sections and would therefore be part of what the model seeks toTABLE 2
PARTNER_:OUNTRY DATA DISCREPANCIES AGGREGATED
OVER THE PERIOD 1965-1978
(In thousandU.S.$)
StTC Section Japan E.E.C. United States
No. Coverage Rank Rank Rank
O. Food & live
animals 6,274.72 5 -28,624.1 _ 8 144,554.06 4
1. Beverages &




fuels 6,194.84 9 :18,835.63 7 11,200.13 7 z
3. Mineral fuelsl :_ lllr--
lubricants& o
"11
related mat. 1,194.17 6 767.85 5 45,254.85 6 _c
4. Animal & veg.
oils, fats &
z
waxes -309.93 8 -729.49 6 2,143.58 8 m




products,n.e.s 189,553.89 4 -85,213.57 9 1:,8,328.09 5
6. Manufactured
m
goods 703,030.57 1 36,902.05 3 230,771.78 2 z7. Machinery& >
transport > Z
equipment 232,763.45 3 983,794.15 1 1,387,706.40 1 o
8. Miscellaneous
manufactured o





elsewhere -472,766.93 10 -130,119.08 10 -651,090.71 10
Country
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explain. Since the main objective of the exercise is to test the ability
of the empirical model to isolate the import smuggling component
of partner-country data discrepancies, and since observed negative
discrepancies tend to indicate that factors other than smuggling may
have dominated the movement of this variable during the period,
the model will therefore be tested only on those sections which
show a positive total over the period under study.
The ranking of SITC sections in the order of magnitude of the
discrepancies (with the largest positive discrepancy ranked first and
the largest negative discrepancy ranked last) reveals that Sections 6,
7 and 8 covering Manufactured Goods, Machinery and Transport
Equipment, and Miscellaneous Manufactured Artii_les, respectively,
are consistently ranked among the top three for all the three coun-
tries considered. This could be viewed aslending further credence to
the assumption that technical smuggling may have been the pre-
dominant type of smuggling activity since the products falling under
the SITE sections cited, by their nature and relative technical com-
plexity, would be prime choices as the subject of such an illicit
operation.
2. The Income Variable (Y)
As developed in the theoretical portion of this study, the income
variable includes the returns from both legal and illegal trade. The
net returns to legal trade enter into the cost-benefit computations of
the smuggler since some amount of legal trade is necessary to cloak
his illicit activities. Likewise, the price (net of the acquisition cost)
which the smuggled portion of the shipment would fetch in the local
market is also relevant since this would be weighed against the
additional costs and benefits of engaging in illegal trade. If the items
that are smuggled in are the same as those composing the legally
imported portion of the import shipment, these two values could be
expected to coincide. If the items are different, then the two values
may vary, although probably not radically since detection would be
minimized the less distinguishable the smuggled items are from the
legally imported ones. It could then be expected that the effects of
these factors would be reflected in a ratio of the relevant domestic
wholesale price index (WPI) in the Philippines to the WPI in the
exporting country. Since the Central Bank of the Philippines pub-
lishes the WPI of imported goods disaggregatedto the one-digit SITE
level, in its Statistical Bulletin, the WPI corresponding to the SITCALANO: IMPORT SMUGGLING 175
section under consideration will therefore be used in computing the
ratio3 of WPIs. The foreign WPI is gathered from various editions of
the United Nations' Statistical Yearbook.
3. The Risk of Getting Caught (p):
The risk of the smugglergetting caught (p) is ideally measuredas
a ratio between the number of shipments which are either meted
fines or forfeited for violating the Tariff and Customs Code and the
number of smuggling attempts. Since the number of smuggling
attempts is not observable, then the number of known smuggling
attempts will be used as a proxy. (The same concept was employed
by Ehrlich (1974) in his study on crime.) The proxy variable will
therefore take on the following form: the number of shipments
which are either meted fines or forfeited over the number of appre-
hended shipments, it should, however, be noted that the risk variable
in this form tends to overstate the actual risk of getting caught.
In view of this, the risk variable will be alternately specified in
terms of the averageeffective rate of duty. The rationale for this
specification is the observation that the average effective rate of
duty, which is expressed as the ratio of the actual tariff duties col-
lected to the total import value, can be viewed asa reflection of the
effectiveness with which the customs authorities perform their job.
Thus, a high averageeffective rate of duty for a certain category of
goods may be taken as indicative of the corresponding level of ef-
ficiency with which the customs authorities collect the customs
duties due on these goods; and the higher the level of efficiency
shown by customs authorities, the higher the risk attached to the
smugglingattempt.
These data are available in both aggregateand disaggregateform,
each having a different source.The aggregatedata are taken from the
CB's Statistical Bulletin while the data which are disaggregateddown
to the level conforming to the disa&gregation of the dependent
variable are from the records of the Bureau of Customs. Both forms
will be included in the estimation.
--- 3. In 197"I, the Central Bank started publishing the WPI, broken down into 26 cate-
gories instead of the usual 10 corresponding to the one-digit SITC, with the new categories
not convertible into the old. In order to maintain the length of the time seriesdata, the
old SITC series was spliced with a new series generated by NCSO using the SITe-based
Philippine Standard Commodity Classification (PSCC).176 JOURNAL OF PHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
The risk variable will thereforebe estimated usingthree alterna-
tive specifications, asfollows: "
PI = number of shipments which are either forfeited or
meted fines, over the number of apprehended ship-.
ments.
P2 = aggregateaverageeffective•rate of duty (total import
duties and fines •collected over the total value of
imports).
P3 = average effective rate of duty per SITC category.
These data are availabledown to the two-digit SITC
level of disaggregation.The level • of disaggregation
used will therefore follow that of the dependent
variable.
4. The Blachmorhet Premium (E):
Two forms of this variable are tried in the regressionestimates.
One is the straightforward difference between the blackmarket
rate and the official exchangerate of the Philippine pesoto the U.S.
dollar• (Ed). The prevailing blackmarket rates are from .Pick's Cur;
rency Yearbook while the official exchange rate isfrom the Inter;
national Fifiancial Statistics of the International Monetary Fund.
The other form isa derivation of the blackmarket premium usingthe
conceptof the purchasingpower parity (Ep).
In its absolute version, purchasingpower parity (PPP) implies
that the equilibrium value of the exchangerate betweencurrencies
of any pair of countriesshould beequalto the ratio of thecountries'
price levels.Under certain conditions, thesevaluescould be expected
to move together and any divergencecould therefore be taken as
an indication of: the existence of trade impediments •and/or
restrictions(Officer 1976). "
•Thisconcept could then be-used to generate a proxy for the
blackmarket premium•asfollows?
For a particular import commodity, let
Ft = the foreign price in period t
(t = 0, 1, 2, ..... n)
Dt = the domesticprice in period t
et=0, 1;2, .... n)ALANO: IMPORT SMUGGLING 177
thus
Dt = rt (1 + 7-)Ft
where
T = tariff rate
r_ = effective exchangerate in period t, defined asfollows:
r; = arbt + (1 - a) rt
where
rbt = black market rate in periodt
rt = official exchangerate in periodt
aand (l-e) = effective weightsofrbt andrt respectively.
Choose a baseyear to where rbo -_ ro and express the above-
defined valuesin index form asfollows:
Fo Fi Ft Fn
Fo Fo Fo Fo
Do Oi Dt D.
Do. Do Do Do
ro rt rt r.
ro ro ro ro
Note that
Dt Ft r; (1 + 7-) Ft rt
Do Fo r_ (1 + T) Fo ro
since T is assumedto be unchangingfrom t = o to t = n. By usingthe
concept of PPP under the assumption that the baseyear, t = o, is
characterized by relative equilibrium in the foreign exchange market.
the following relationships are derived:




(Di/Do) / (Fi/Fo) _ (Firi*/Fo ro) / (Ff/Fo) = (r_-/r______) = r]
(ri/ro) (ri/ro) (ri/ro) ri
and soon up to t = n, sincethe baseyear ischosensuchthat
ro = rb =re
Thus, (Dt/D°)/(FtF°) 1 can be take as an estimate of --(r_)--1or
rr/ro rt
/'_ -- rt
, which is the premium a trader who is engaged in both
rr
legal and illegal trade has to face in procuring foreign exchange
from both official and blackmarket sources.
The expression (Dr/Do) will be represented by the ratio of the
WPI for imported goods in the Philippines. Data on this will be
taken from the CB's Statistical Bulletin. Similarly, (Ft/Fo) will be re-
presented by the ratio of the WPI prevailing in the partner country
under consideration. On the other hand, (rt/ro) will be represented
by the official exchange rate between the Philippine pesoand the U.S.
dollar. Data on this will be taken from the International Financial
Statistics of the IMF. The year 1973 hasbeenchosen asthe baseyear
since this was when the Philippines experienced a trade surplus as
well asrelative stability in the foreign exchange market.
5. The Dummy Variables (dl and d2)
Containerized cargoeswere received at the Port of Manila asearly
aS1970. Thus the dummy variable, dl, which assumesthe value zero
from 1965 to 1969 and one from 1970 to 1978, isspecified tocatcll
the effects of containerization.
In September 1972, martial law was imposed in the Philippines
and this was accompanied by comprehensive changes in various
government offices, including the Bureau of Customs. Considering
that the avowed purpose of these changes was to weed out corrup-
tion in the government, they may have therefore influenced the
smuggling pattern during the period. The dummy variable, d2, isALANO: IMPORT SMUGGLING 179
therefore included in the specified equation to reflect the possible
impact of this change in policy. This variable is zero from 1965 to
1972 and is equal to one from 1973 to 1978.
B. Results of Regression
Using the empirical model developed in the preceding section,
ordinary least square regressions were run using time series data at
three levels of aggregation: overall total, country level and SITC sec-
tion level. The equations are chosen on the basis of the level of
significance and "correctness" of the signs (in the sensethat the signs
come out asexpected) of the coefficients aswell asthe magnitude of
the R2 values. The results are presented below, employing variables
defined previously asfollows:
D = partner-country data discrepancy (exports-imports) in
million U.S. dollars.
Ed = blackmarket premium represented as the difference
between the blackmarket exchange rate and the of-
ficial exchange rate of the Philippine peso to the U.S.
dollar.
Ep = effective blackmarket premium derived by using the
concept of purchasingpower parity.
P1,P2,P3 = various forms of the probability of getting caught
(see preceding section for a detailed definition of
each).
y = the income variable, represented as the ratio of
domestic and foreign wholesaleprice indices.
d1,d2 = dummy variablesfor the adventof containerization in 1970
and the imposition of martial law in the Philippines in September
1972, respectively, where dl=0 from 1965-1969 and d1=1 from
1970-1978 whiled2=0 from 1965-1972 and d2=1 from 1973-1978.
1. Overall total
D = - 428.66+ 245.26Ed--5855.44P 2 + 3828.39Y
(0.75) (1.98) (4.10)
R2 = 0.680 F = 7.07 D.W. = 1.25
2. Country level
a. lapan
D = - 247.80 + 128.82Ea - 1181.25P 2 + 1346.48 Y
(14.) (1.55) (6.11)180 JOURNAL OF PHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
R2 -0.850 F= 18.92 D.W. = 1.02
b. USA
D =- 171.08 + 56.48Ed - 1131.42P 2 + 1060.93Y
(0.4) (0.85) (2.55)
R2 ffi0.502 F= 3.36 D.W. ffi1.28
c. EEC
D = - 1165.05 + 27.55Ed -- 724.06P2 + 812.39 Y
(0.3.7) (0.96) (2.75)




D =--.44--.82Ed + 5.81P2 +.73Y
(0.28) (0.2) (0.1)
R2 =<).026 F= 0.09 D.W. =2.13
Section 1
D = -.05 + 0.03Ed + 0,37P2 + 0.02Y
(2.26) (4.48) (0.42)
R2 = 0.746 F = 9.82 D.W. = 2.22
Section 3
D = 3.37--0.82Ed -- 28.80P 3 + 4.38Y
(0.51) (1.71) (0.87)
R 2 = 0.343 F= 1.74 D.W. - 2.1.7
Section 5
D = - 7.63 + 3.30Ea - 13.62P 2 + 5,5.69 Y
(0.85) (0.41) (7.50)
R 2 =0.9t8 F= 37.17 D.W. = 1.83
Section 6
D = 34.23 + 40.67Ed -- 521.25P 2 + 195.06Y
(I .67) (2.30) (3.47)
R2 =0.608 F = 5.16 D.W, = 2.94
Section 7
D = -591.81 + 85.62Ed + 491.50P2 + 1289.44Y
(0.79) (0.68) (4.66)
R 2 =0.777 F= 11.63 D.W. =0.76ALANO: IMPORTSMUGGLING 181
Section 8
D = 8.53 + 8.15Ed -- 50.02P2 + 74.96Y
(I .43) (I .23) (7.02)
R2 = 0.868 F = 21.87 D.W. = 1.30
b. USA
Section 0
D = 0.81 + 2.65Ed -- 38.65P2 + 31.83 Y
(0.46) (0.2) (1.25)
R2 = 0.222 F= 0.95 D.W. = 3.13
Section 1
D = 30.42 - 36.60P2 - 18.75Ep - 36_68Y
(3.73) (4.3) (4.41)
R2 = 0.673 F = 6.85 D.W. = 1.37
Section 2
D : 6.55 -- 1.42Ed -- 13.46P2 - 6.53Y
(0.45) (0.46) (0.'/8)
R2 = 0.268 F= 1.22 D.W. = 1.81
Section 3
D = 4664.30 - 882.98Ed -- 6971.18P 1 -- 3775.50Y
(0.55) (1.81) (I .45)
R 2 =0.633 F = 5.75 D.W. = 1.31
Section 4
D = -0.82 -0.71Ea + 14.56P2- 2.55Y
(0.85) (1.86) (1.39)
R2 = 0.295 F = 1.40 D.W. = 2.92
Section 5
D = -36.59 - 7.45Ea + 91.36P1 + 42.47 Y
(0.26) (1.18) (I .I0)
R2 = 0.281 F = 1.30 D.W. = 1.70
Section 6
D= 17.80- 4.13Ed -- 181.35P2 + 71386.94Y
(0.7) (2.91) (4.31)
R 2 = 0.670 F= 6.77 D.W. - 2.06182 JOURNAL OF PHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
Section 7
D =-337.60 + 52.83Ea - 117.47P2 + 803.18Y
(1.I) (0.33) (4.99)
R2 = 0.821 F= 15.25 D.W. = 0.93
Section 8
D =-18.62 + 6.81Ed -72.59P2 + 81.43Y
(0.7) (0.99) (3.85)
R_ = 0.664 F = 6.61 D.W. = 1.04
c. EEC
Section 1
D = 1.70+ 0.58Ed -- 1.65P1 - 2.19Y
(0.53) (0.55) (0.4)
R2 = 0.034 F= 0.12 D.W. = 2.20
Section 3
D = 0.97 -- 0.3lEd -- 6.47P2 + 0.57Y
(0.56) (I .34) (0.3)
R2 = 0.244 F = 1.07 D.W. = 2.41
Section 6
D = 5.33 + 5.80Ea -- 156.78P2 + 50.01 Y
(1.12) (2.42) (2.44)
R2 = 0.430 F= 2.51 D.W. = 1.32
Section 7
D = -387.20 - 48.25Ed + 461.14,° 2 + 844.75 Y
(0.57) (0.91) (2.20)
R2 = 0.532 F = 3.78 D,W, = 0.44
Section 8
D = -6.40 + 1.04Ed -- 22.60P2 + 37.14Y
(0.35) (0.99) (4.54)
R2 = 0.745 F = 9.75 D.W. = 1.33
The numbers in parentheses underneath each coefficient are the
t-values. The coefficient of determination (R2), the F, and the Dur-
bin-Watson statistics for each equation are also reported. The R2
values reveal that the model is able to explain quite a significant
amount of variation in the discrepancy D at all levels of aggrega-
tion. It should also be noted that the R2 values for equations cover-ALANO: IMPORT SMUGGLING 183
ing trade with Japan at both the country and section levels are
relatively higher than those for the U.S. and the EEC. It could be
that Japan's relative proximity to the Philippines makes it a more
accessibleand cheaper source of smuggledgoods.
Furthermore, at the section level, equations covering Sections 6,
7 and 8 show relatively high R2 values. It should be recalled that
these sections consistently ranked among the top three for all three
countries when the sections were ranked in the order of magnitude
of the positive discrepancies at the section level. These results there-
fore tend to indicate that quite a significant amount of these dis-
crepancies may have been due to smuggling.
The coefficients of the dummy variables d1 and d2 did not turn
out to besignificantly different from zero at any level of aggregation;
thus, the variables were subsequently dropped from the equations.
The country level equations as well as the equation covering the
overall total show Y to be the only variable with significant coef-
ficients. However, at the section level, the coefficients of P2, in addi-
tion to those of Y, show consistently significant t-values in equations
covering Section 6 (Manufactured Goods) for all three countries.
Since the variable P2 represents the aggregateeffective rate of duty,
the above results indicate that the efficiency with which import
duties are collected by customs authorities may have had quite a sig-
nificant deterrent effect in the smuggling of manufactured goods.
In fact, the estimated equations show that, everything else remaining
the same, an increase in the aggregateeffective rate of duty by 10
percentage points would result in a decline of $52 million in smug-
gling from Japan, $18 million from the U.S., and $16 million from
the EEC for a total decline of $86 million in smuggling from the
three countries considered. The results indicate that it may there-
fore be worthwhile for the Bureau of Customs to consider further
increasing its efficiency in the collection of import duties, parti-
cularly on imports of manufactured goods.
It should also be noted that the equation covering Section I for
the United States shows highly significant t-values for the coef-
ficients of P2 (the coefficient of y is also significant although the
sign is perverse). Section 1 covers beveragesand tobacco and it is
quite a well-known fact that such items from the United States have
a relatively high consumer demand in the Philippines and are there-
fore likely to be objects of smuggling attempts. The-customs autho-
rities at the frontier are also possibly aware of this; thus, shipments184 JOURNAL OF PHi LIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
which are either known or suspected to contain these items are
most probably subjected to •careful scrutiny. One would therefore
expect the coefficient of the risk variable to. turn out to be sig-
nifleant.
Another item of note is the fact that the•variable representing
the blackmarket •.premium (Ep, in. this case) shows a significant
coefficient in the equation •covering Section 1 .for the U.S.., while
the samevariable shows an i_nsignificantcoefficient in the equation
covering Section 6, whether-it be for the U,S. or the other two
countries represented. (It will be recalled thatproducts under Sec-
tion 6 were mentioned earlier to be likely objects of smuggling.and
that the risk variable was observed to have a significant coefficient.)
One possible explanation for this is the fact that most itemsunder
Section 1 are classified by .the Central Bank-as either banned or
under import quota (Non-Essential Consumer or NEC and Unclassi-
fied Consumer or UC categories)while most items under Section 6
are not under such restrictions. Thus, illegalimportations of goods
under Section 1 would most likely come in asundeclared items, pos-
sibly packed together with items which are legally importable.
Since the foreign exchange which was used to buy the undeclared
portion of the shipment could not be procured from legal sources,
it would have had to .be bought• from the blackmarket and the
smuggler would have had to face the blackmarket premium. Given
this scenario, one would therefore• expect the variable representing
the blackmarket premium to come out with a Significant Coefficient
in the equation coveringhectlon 1.
Most items under Section .6,on the other hand, could be import-
• ed through the use of a letter of credit opened with the bank. This
gives the importer accessto foreign exchange at the official rate.
Any evasion of duties and taxes could then be accomplished.through
less risky means such as misclassification or unde, rdevaluation.
This could also be taken•as the explanation for the higher level
of significance of the coefficient of the risk variable it1 Section i
(U..S.) i'elative to that in any of the •equationscovering Section 6 (the
t-Value for P2 for Section 1 (U.S.) is 3.73 while for Section 6, t is
equal to 2.2 for Japan, 2.91 for the U.S. and 2.42 for the EEC),
MiSdeclaration (the most probable method of Smuggling in Section
1 itemS) is relatively more risky than. either misclassification or
undervaluation (the most probable method of tax evasionon ship-
ments of items under Section 6) since the mere discovery .of theALANO: iMPORT SMUGGLING 185
undeclared items by the customs examiner is usually taken asprima
facie evidence of fraud and therefore makes the shipment subject
to seizure by the customs authorities. On the other hand, the sei-
zure of an importation which isthe subjectof either misclassification
or undervaluation (or both) usually requires a more technically
involved process,thus affording the smugglermuch greater odds.
The regressionresults indicate that the empirical model develop-
ed in this study can providesomeinterestingand useful insightsinto
the nature of smugglingactivities. The resultsalsoreveal the extent
to w'hichinformation islost in an aggregative analysisof the problem
and therefore serveto emphasizethe advantagesof adetailed analy-
sisin thisarea of study.
IV, AN ESTIMATE OF THE SMUGGLING LEVEL
in this section, an attempt iSmadeto generate an estimate of the
smuggling level from the partner Countries considered during the
period under study. This is accomplishedby Substituting the values
of the independent variable appearing in the regressiOtiequations
estimated in t_hepreceding section, to Come up with the computed
discrepancy,D. Given the validity of the theoretical analysismade
earlier, the empirical model formulated from it could be expected to
account for the variation Gausedby the smugglingcomponent of the
discrepancy__, in partner-country data. It wasfurther arguedthat
the components of the error term Ui of the empirical model are
generally random in nature and tend toward Zero in the long run
such that the least squaresassumption that E(Ui) = 0 is satisfied,
In the light of the above, it would therefore be justified to assume
that the computed discrepancy,D, representsan estimate of the
smuggling level. The equations generated from time series data
aSpresentedinSection 4.2 above,are Usedin generatingthe estimate,
Table 3 presentsvalues of D at various levels of aggregation.
The estimate of the smugglinglevelfrom the threecountriesfor the
period 1965-78 therefore ranges from $5,968,30i,350 to
$11,093_939,350. Thesefiguresare 28.95 percent and 53.8i percent,
respectively_of the reported total export value to the Philippihes
during the period. The regressionequations at aggregatelevelsare
expected to yield lower estimates than those at the se'¢_ionlevel
Since the effects of misclassificati0nwhich isseento be a_ predomi-
nant method of technical smugglingare not evident at higher aggre-186 JOURNAL OF PHI LIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
TABLE 3
ESTIMATE OF SMUGGLING AT DIFFERENT
AGGREGATE LEVELS
I. EstimateUsingRegression on Over-allTotal
_b = $5,968,301,350 %of Total Export Value= 28.95
I1. EstimateUsingCountry LevelEquations:% of exportvalue a
A. Japan : _c= $3,054,734,210 32.3
B. U.S.A. : = 1,930,549,230 25.5
C. EEC : = $1,071,259,540 28.8
Total D = $6,002,548,980 29.11
IIi. Estimate UsingSITCSection Level Equations
% of %of %of
Japand Export U.S.A.d Export EECd Export
Value Value Value
__ |
Section 0 $6,274,510 1.91 $146,911.650 13.42
Section 1 493,450 62.30 655.500 0.37 2,]62,740 6.49
Section 2. 11,200,300 1.94
Section 3 1,194,300 2.30 4,511,191,410 4.05 767,620 6.66
Section4 2,147,680 6.04
Section5 189,553,770 17.15 118,328,010 12.82
Section 6 703,030,550 22.63 230,771,730 20.7 36,902,000 9.10
Section 7 2,327,697,700 57.30 1,367,706,370 45.0 897,629,800 45.24
Section 8 251,857,710 71.54 221,249,130 59.37 67,584,420 53.75
Country




% of Total Export Valuea = 5_.81
a. %of export value = (D/Export value) x 100.
b. Estimated smuggling level ascomputed from aggregate regressionequation.
c. Estimated smuggling level as computed from country level equations.
d. Estimated smu_ling level as computed from section level equations.ALANO: IMPORT SMUGGLING 187
gate levels. This is because,at these levels, the positivediscrepancies
which would normally be observedin sectionswherein the misclassi-
fled articlesare declaredwould cancelout the negativediscrepancies
observed in sectionswhere thesearticlesshould have been declared.
The smugglingestimates at the section level revealthat the sec-
tions covering items which may be considered to be likely objects
of technical smuggling have a relatively high smuggling incidence.
The columnsshowingsmugglingasa percentageof reported exports
revealthat sections6, 7 and 8 coveringmanufactured goods,machi-
nery and transport equipment, and miscellaneous manufactured
goods, respectively,consistently show the highest percentages. In
fact, it isonly in the caseof japan - whereSection 1 (coveringbeve-
ragesand tobacco) has the second highest percentage- that the
aboveobservationdoesnot hold.
The items under these sections, as may be gatheredfrom their
descriptive headings,consistmainly of finished products and would
therefore be expected to be relatively diverseand complex ascom-
pared to those in other sections. Furthermore, one would expect
a relatively dynamic basket of goods under these sectionsin the
sense that new product lines are constantly emerging and there is
a relatively high rate of change in the design and specifications of
existing ones. These are the characteristicswhich make it difficult
for the customs authorities to accurately determine the proper
value and classification of imported items. Attempts at evading
import duties through technical smuggling would therefore have
relatively high chancesof success if the shipments in question con-
tained items under the aforementioned sections. The fact that
the estimated smugglinglevels are highest for these sectionsthere-
fore lends further support to the assumption made earlier that
technical smuggling is the predominant form of evading import
duties in the Philippines.
V. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
This study has endeavored to demonstrate the usefulnessof a
model basedon the smuggler'scalculusin providing insightsinto the
nature and extent of smugglingactivity in the Philippines.A theore-
tical model wasdevelopedalongthe linessuggested by Becket (1974)
and Ehrlich (1974), and the behavioral implicationsderived from it
were in turn usedasa basisfor formulating an empirical model which188 JOURNAL OF PHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
sought to isolate the smugglingcomponent of discrepanciesin part-
ner-country data.
The empirical model was estimated at different levelsof aggre-
gation usingdataon discrepancies arisingout of Philippinetrade with
its major trading partners. A study of the regressionresultsrevealed
the advantagesof a detailed analysisin this endeavor, as the con-
clusions that were derived• concerning the nature• of smuggling
activity in the Philippines were formulated from a study of the
estimates generated at the one-digit SITC level. These inferences
were not evident from an analysisof the resultsat higheraggregation
levels.
In particular, the results rendered further credence to the as-
sumption that technical smugglingthrough legal trade channels is
the predominant smugglingactivity in the Philippines. Relatively
good fits were found for equationscorrespondingto SITC sections
coveringitemswhichareseento bevulnerableto technicalsmuggling.
The regressionresults were also used to come up with an esti-
mate of the smugglinglevel. This estimate was found to rangefrom
28.95 percent (for the estimate derived from a regressionof the over-
all total) to 53.81 percent (from section level regressions)of the re-
ported exports tot hePhilippines of the partner-countries considered
during the period under study.
The model, therefore, has been found to provide a useful frame-
work for an analysis of smugglingin the Philippines. It hasnot only
made possible the formulation of conclusions concerning the nature
of the smuggling activity which may prove useful in policymaking
as regards the enforcement of customs and tariff laws, but more
importantly, it has also served as a framework for the generation
of an estimate of the smuggling level which may be used to correct
a possible bias in foreign trade data which is due to smuggling.
There are, however, some areas which still remain unexplored
and which could be the subject of further studies. For one, the
model, having been developed under the assumption that technical
smuggling is the predominant smuggling activity, is not equipped to
fully address the situation where pure smuggling dominates the
smuggling industry. Although this is represented in the theoretical
model by the casewhere the choice variable "a" iscloseto or equal
to one, there are additional costs to pure smuggling which could
• be significant enough under this situation as to require explicit
consideration in the model.ALANO:IMPORT SMUGGLING 189
Corollary to this is the need to directly address the issue of the
existence of legal trade at the industry level under the pure smuggling
situation• Although the cases where a--1 necessarily means that the
smuggler has decided not to use legally traded goods to cloak his
illegal shipments, the question as to whether or not legal trade will
still exist if all smugglers decided to do the same thing was not consi-
dered in the analysis. There is therefore a need to further explore
the macroeconomic implications of the model.
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